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INTRODUCTION 
Bid strategy modelling has traditionally 
been concerned with setting the mark up 
level to a value that is likely to provide the 
best pay off. Famous construction bid strat-
egy models include those proposed by 
Friedman (1956), Gates (1961) and Carr 
(1982). More recently bid strategy modelling 
has expanded to encompass contracts 
awarded on a multi-criteria basis. For ex-
ample, construction clients are increasingly 
calling for bids that require competing con-
tractors to submit both bid price and con-
tract time (Shen et al., 1999). In such cases 
contractors’ bid prices and proposed con-
tract times are commonly assessed in ac-
cordance with the following equation 
(Herbsman et al., 1995): 
TCB = p + (UTV x t)   (1) 
where  
TCB = Total combined bid 
p = price 
UTV = unit time value specified by the client 
(such as liquidated damages rate) 
t = time 
The contractor with the lowest TCB is 
awarded the contract. Shen et al. (1999) 
have considered this from a contractor’s bid 
strategy viewpoint by relating the contrac-
tor’s price-time curve to the client’s price-
time curve and from this they have devel-
oped a mathematical bid optimisation 
model. The rationale behind the model is 
illustrated in Figure 1. It is widely accepted 
(e.g. Callahan et al., 1991) that every com-
peting contractor has an optimum price-
time point for each construction contract. 
The price-time curve of a contractor is 
shown in Figure 1 as being S1 with the opti-
mum point as B1 and the corresponding bid 
price-time combination as p1, t1. The liqui-
dated damages rate, commonly used to  
represent UTV, is shown as a straight line 
(S2) since it is a constant rate. The total 
combined bid curve S (i.e. assessed cost to 
the client) becomes S1 + S2. The optimum 
point at which the contractor is most com-
petitive from the client’s viewpoint is B0. The 
contractor should, therefore, submit the bid 
price-time combination p0, t0 to the client. 
Consultants are faced with a similar prob-
lem in two envelope fee bidding given that 
the commission is awarded on the combined 
basis of price (i.e. fee) and quality (i.e. tech-
nical proposal). Consultants are required to 
submit to the client one envelope containing 
the technical proposal and a second enve-
lope containing the fee. Each competing 
consultant’s technical proposal and fee is 
then converted by the client to a score and 
aggregated. The consultant with the highest 
overall score is then awarded the commis-
sion (see, for example, Construction Indus-
try Board (1996) for a detailed explanation of 
two envelope fee bidding procedures). 
Bid strategy decision making is more com-
plicated in price-time contracts and two en-
velope fee bidding. In addition to setting the 
mark up level to provide the best pay off, 
bidders need to make an additional decision 
with regard to the second criterion. For ex-
ample, they must decide whether to submit 
a higher (or lower) tender price with a 
shorter (or longer) contract period, or in the 
case of two envelope fee bidding, on 
whether to aim for a higher technical score 
(which is likely to require a higher fee) or 
submit a lower fee (which is likely to result 
in a lower technical score). The objective of 
an optimum bid strategy model is to provide 
the bidder with an optimal solution, whether 
it be optimum mark-up (as with traditional 
price only models) or optimum price-time or 
fee-technical score combination (with bi-
parameter models).  
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Figure 1: The price-time relationship between the contractor’s price-time curve (S1) and the  
                 client’s price-time curve (S) (Source: Shen et al. 1999) 
 
Based on the same logic proposed by Shen 
et al. (1999), Drew et al. (2002b) offered con-
sultants an optimum bid strategy model for 
two envelope fee bidding. They show that 
consultants have a choice of aiming for a 
low scored technical proposal-low fee com-
bination or a high scored technical pro-
posal-high fee combination or a 
combination in between, and that only one of 
these combinations will result in the highest 
possible aggregated score. They claim that 
if consultants follow the modelling approach 
set out in their paper, they should be in a 
position to better identify their optimum fee-
technical score combination, thereby in-
creasing their chances of winning the com-
mission. Drew et al. (2002b) introduced the 
modelling approach using hypothetical ex-
amples. This paper sets out to test the mod-
elling approach using data supplied by a 
Hong Kong quantity surveying consultant. 
Aggregating fees and technical score 
Construction clients set out the two enve-
lope bidding procedures that consultants 
are required to follow. This includes using a 
particular formulation with which to aggre-
gate the fees and technical scores. Drew et 
al. (2001) identified seven different fee-
technical score formulations from the lit-
erature and also suggested two more new 
formulations. A commonly used formulation 
(Connaughton, 1994), also used by the Hong 
Kong Housing Authority (one of Hong Kong’s 
largest public sector clients), is:  
CA = Wqq/qmax + Wf fmin/f   (2) 
where 
qmax = highest technical score 
q = consultant’s technical score 
f = consultant’s fee 
fmin = lowest fee 
Wq = predetermined weighting 
for technical score 
Wf = predetermined weighting 
for fees 
CA = total score  
The consultant with the highest CA value 
wins the contract. For example, suppose 
there were four competing consultants la-
belled A, B, C and D who submitted respec-
tive fees of $5.43, $5.14, $4.42 and $4.62 
million and whose technical proposals were 
given scores of 82, 76, 69 and 73. Suppose 
also that the technical score/fee predeter-
mined weightings were 70/30 respectively. 
Table 1 shows Consultant A winning the 
competition. 
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Table 1: Aggregating fee and technical score using Equation 2 
Consultant 
Identities 
TM F$M TSc FSc TotSc Rank 
A 82 5.43 70.0 24.3 94.30 1 
B 76 5.14 65.1 25.8 90.90 3 
C 69 4.42 58.8 30.0 88.80 4 
D 73 4.62 62.3 28.7 91.00 2 
The example also shows that fees and tech-
nical scores are, to some extent, positively 
correlated (i.e. Consultant A submitted the 
highest fee and obtained the highest techni-
cal score, Consultant C submitted the low-
est fee and obtained the lowest technical 
score and Consultants B and D somewhere 
in between). It can be seen that this be-
comes a negative correlation when con-
verted to a ratio since the fee ratio is an 
inverse ratio. An important reason for such 
a correlation is that architectural, engineer-
ing and surveying commissions are re-
garded as a ‘complex intellectual process’ 
(Construction Industry Board, 1996) and as 
such, in order to deliver a good quality ser-
vice, two important variables are total time 
spent on the commission, and experience of 
the consultant. With a lower fee the consult-
ant will not be able to spend so much time 
on the commission and/or use less experi-
enced staff. Spending less time and/or using 
less experienced staff should result in the 
consultant receiving a lower raw technical 
score. On the other hand, greater experi-
ence and more involvement are likely to re-
sult in a consultant receiving a higher 
technical score. Since experienced staff are 
normally paid higher salaries this is likely to 
require a larger fee. A higher technical 
score therefore requires a larger fee, and 
fees are likely to go up at an increasing rate 
according to the technical score (because of 
the increased rate of salary differences be-
tween lower and higher paid staff). This 
suggests that there is a positive convex cor-
relation between fee and raw technical 
score. 
The fee-raw technical score correlation that 
is often produced when consultants are in 
competition with one another will also occur 
with a particular consultant deciding on 
whether to aim for a low scored technical 
proposal-low fee combination or a high 
scored technical proposal-high fee  
combination or something in between. For 
example, suppose Consultant A had devel-
oped three technical proposals for the 
commission just described. The three tech-
nical proposals may attract full fees of say 
$4.43, $5.43 and $6.43 million respectively. 
If all three technical proposals were scored 
it is quite likely that the raw technical scores 
and corresponding fees would, to some ex-
tent, be positively correlated.  
Determining the optimum fee and  
technical score 
The consultant’s objective in two envelope 
fee bidding is to get the highest possible 
total score since this maximizes the chance 
of winning the commission. In the previous 
example the consultant would submit the 
fee-technical proposal combination that it 
thought would result in the highest score. 
Drew et al. (2002b) claim that consultants 
can actually determine the highest scoring 
fee-technical proposal combination for a 
particular commission by following the fol-
lowing seven steps: 
1. Assemble the technical proposal and 
calculate the corresponding fee in the nor-
mal way, then estimate the corresponding 
technical score.  
2. Determine the absolute lowest full fee 
for the commission and estimate the corre-
sponding technical score  
3. Estimate the absolute highest technical 
score for the commission and determine the 
corresponding full fee.  
4. Use the client’s formulation (e.g. Equa-
tion 2) and calculate the three respective 
total scores using (1) the original fee and 
corresponding technical score, (2) absolute 
lowest fee and corresponding technical 
score and (3) absolute highest technical 
score and corresponding fee.  
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Figure 2: Possible optimum fee outcomes (Source: Drew et al. 2002b)  
 
5. Regress the three total scores 
against the fee to produce a total score con-
tinuum. Since the continuum, represented 
by a line, is regressed on three points it will 
almost certainly be curvilinear in shape, 
being either concave or convex. Figure 2 
shows that there are three possible out-
comes. If concave, the optimum fee will fall 
at the highest point along the continuum 
(i.e. Outcome 1). If, however, the continuum 
is convex, the optimum fee will fall at either 
the low end (i.e. Outcome 2) or high end (i.e. 
Outcome 3) of the continuum. 
6. Determine the optimum fee for Outcome 
1 using differentiation since the total score 
continuum, represented by a curvilinear re-
gression line, is based on the equation: 
Y = a + bx +cx2    (3) 
where  
Y = total score 
x = fee 
For Outcome 2 and 3 the optimum fee is 
simply that shown at either the low end (i.e. 
Outcome 2) or high end (i.e. Outcome 3) of 
the continuum. 
7. Determine the optimum technical score 
for Outcome 1 by inserting the optimum fee 
and total score into the client’s formulation 
to find the corresponding technical score. 
For Outcome 2 and 3 the optimum technical 
score is the one already estimated. The 
original technical proposal should then be 
adjusted to reflect the optimum technical 
score. This may involve including more/less 
staff with greater/less experience and/or 
spending more or less time on the commis-
sion. The optimum fee and the adjusted 
technical proposal should then be submitted 
to the procurer.  
In addition to illustrating the foregoing ap-
proach using hypothetical examples, Drew 
et al. (2002b) were able to show the effect of 
using the optimum bid strategy on bidding 
performance. They identified that this could 
be done by measuring the optimum total 
score percentage increase on the original 
total score. This seven step approach will be 
replicated and developed in this paper using 
data collected from a leading Hong Kong 
quantity surveying consultant.  
DATA COLLECTION 
The consultant, who regularly tenders for 
Hong Kong Housing Authority commissions, 
provided the following data for 51 bidding 
attempts: 
1. Original fee 
2. Estimated raw score 
3. Absolute low fee 
4. Corresponding estimated technical score 
5. Absolute high estimated technical score 
6. Corresponding fee 
Case 36 Case 37
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7. Fee/technical score predetermined  
weighting 
8. Tender date 
The commissions were tendered for be-
tween September 1997 and April 2001. The 
Hong Kong Housing Authority used fee-
technical score predetermined weightings of 
30/70 for 14 cases and 50/50 for the remain-
ing 37 cases. The fees submitted ranged 
from just under HK$1 million to just under 
HK$17 million. The Hong Kong Housing Au-
thority uses Equation 2 to aggregate fees 
and technical scores. 
ANALYSIS 
The analysis is in three parts. Three repre-
sentative cases are used in the first part of 
the analysis to illustrate each of the three 
possible outcomes (i.e. Outcome 1 = in be-
tween absolute low fee/absolute high tech-
nical score, Outcome 2 = absolute low 
fee/low technical score, Outcome 3 = abso-
lute high technical score/high fee). The fre-
quency of the three possible outcomes and 
the effect of the predetermined weightings 
are considered in the second part of the 
analysis. The last part considers the effect 
that the optimum bidding strategy has on 
the consultant’s original bidding performance.  
REPRESENTATIVE CASES 
ILLUSTRATING THE THREE 
DIFFERENT OUTCOMES 
The three possible outcomes are illustrated 
with cases 36, 37 and 38. Table 2 shows the 
(1) original fee/estimated raw score, (2) ab-
solute low fee/corresponding estimated 
technical score and (3) absolute high esti-
mated technical score/corresponding fee 
combinations for these three representative 
cases. The fees and technical marks are 
converted into fee, technical and total 
scores using Equation 2. For Case 36 it can 
be seen the consultant’s original fee and 
estimated raw score produced the highest 
score, while for Case 37 the absolute high 
estimated technical score and correspond-
ing fee resulted in the highest total score 
and for Case 38 the absolute lowest 
fee/corresponding technical score combina-
tion yielded the highest total score. 
Regression analysis is used to produce the 
total score continuums. Figure 3 shows a 
concave curve for Case 36 (i.e. Outcome 1), a 
positive convex curve for Case 37 (i.e. Out-
come 3) and a negative convex curve for 
Case 38 (i.e. Outcome 2). For Case 36 the 
regression equation coefficients generated 
by the Excel software package are:  
Y = -1397.81 + 890.84x – 132.60x2  (4)
 
Table 2: Technical Scores, Fee Scores and Total Scores for Competition Nos. 36, 37 and 38  
                using Equation 2 with a 50/50 predetermined weighting 
Case No. TM F$M TSc FSc TotSc Rank 
 45.00 3.20 45.00 50.00 95.00 3 
 46.95 3.24 46.95 49.43 96.38 1 
36 50.00 3.50 50.00 45.71 95.71 2 
  Mean 47.32 48.38   
  SD 2.52 2.33   
  SD Ratio 1.08    
 40.00 5.40 40.00 50.00 90.00 2 
 42.53 6.06 42.53 44.59 87.12 3 
37 50.00 6.50 50.00 41.54 91.54 1 
  Mean 44.18 45.38   
  SD 5.20 4.29   
  SD Ratio 1.21    
 35.00 4.00 38.89 50.00 88.89 1 
 38.86 6.23 43.18 32.09 75.27 3 
38 45.00 7.00 50.00 28.57 78.57 2 
  Mean 44.02 36.89   
  SD 5.60 11.49   
  SD Ratio 0.49    
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Figure 3: Total score continuums for Cases 36, 37 and 38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using differentiation the optimum fee be-
comes: 
Y1 = 890.84 – 265.20x   (5) 
 x = 890.84/265.20   (6) 
 x = 3.359    (7) 
With an optimum fee of $3.359 million, the 
optimum total score becomes: 
Y = -1397.81 + (890.84 x 3.359) – (132.60 x 3.3592)
     (8) 
Y = -1397.81 + 2992.33 – 1496.11  (9) 
Y = 98.41 (10) 
Given an optimum fee of $3.359 million and 
an optimum total score of 98.41, the corre-
sponding technical score can be found by 
using Equation 2 i.e. 
98.41 = 50 (q / 50) + 50 (3.00 / 3.359) 
 (11) 
98.41 = q + 44.66 (12) 
q = 98.41 – 44.66 (13) 
q = 53.75 (14) 
The original technical proposal should be 
amended to achieve a raw score of 53.75. 
The amended technical proposal and a fee 
of $3.359 million should be submitted to the 
client. 
For Cases 37 and 38 the solution is much 
simpler since the highest score occurs at 
the either end of the continuum. For Case 37 
the consultant should submit a fee of $6.5 
million and adjust the technical proposal to 
obtain a raw score of 50.00. For Case 38 the 
consultant should put in a fee of $4.00 mil-
lion and adjust the technical proposal to 
obtain a raw score of 35.00. 
FREQUENCY OF THE THREE 
DIFFERENT OUTCOMES AND EFFECT 
OF THE PREDETERMINED 
WEIGHTINGS 
The three cases illustrate each of the possi-
ble outcomes. The same approach was used 
to analyse all 51 cases. Interestingly Table 3 
shows that in only 10 cases did the optimum 
total score fall in between absolute low fee 
and absolute high technical score (i.e.  
Outcome 1), while in 20 cases it aligned with 
absolute low fee (i.e. Outcome 2) and in 21 
cases with absolute high technical score 
(i.e. Outcome 3). The results show that the 
optimum fee – technical proposal combina-
tion will most likely occur at one end of the 
consultant’s continuum and there is an al-
most even chance of it occurring either at 
the low fee or high technical score end of 
the continuum. 
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The reason why there are only 10 cases that 
produce a result in between absolute low 
fee and absolute high technical score (i.e. 
Outcome 1) is because of the variability dif-
ferences between fees and technical score. 
This can be explained by referring back to 
the three representative cases. Table 2 
shows the respective fee and technical 
score standard deviations of 2.52 and 2.33 
for Case 36. This produces a standard devia-
tion ratio of 1.08 meaning that fee and tech-
nical scores are almost equal in terms of 
variability (see Drew et al. 2002a for ade-
tailed treatment of this aspect). For Case 37 
it can be seen that technical scores vary 
more than fee score meaning that technical 
score is more dominant in the aggregation 
and for Case 38 fee score varies more than 
technical score meaning that fees are more 
dominant in the aggregation. In other words, 
Outcome 1 (i.e. in between) will be most 
likely to occur where the fee/technical score 
variability is more or less equal. However, 
where fee score varies more than technical 
score, Outcome 2 (i.e. absolute low fee) is 
likely to occur and where technical score 
varies more than fee score, Outcome 3 (i.e. 
absolute high technical score) is likely to occur.  
The even split of 15 low fee competitions to 
15 high technical score competitions for 
50/50 and corresponding 5 to 6 for 70/30 
indicates that the change in weightings from 
70/30 to 50/50 has very little effect on the 
proportion of competitions that require a 
low fee or high technical score. 
The effect of optimum bidding strategy 
on original bidding performance  
Tables 4 and 5 show the actual and percent-
age differences between optimal total 
scores and original total scores obtained by 
the consultant for the 70/30 and 50/50 pre-
determined weightings. For 70/30 prede-
termined weightings Table 5 shows that the 
consultant’s overall total score increased 
from 88.08 to 92.19 giving an average im-
provement of 4.84%. For 50/50 Table 6 
shows that the consultant’s overall score 
increased from 82.61 to 88.74 making an 
average improvement of 7.90%. Tables 5 
and 6 also show that the overall improve-
ment range is from 30.80% to just 0.41%. 
Interestingly there were eleven competitions 
whereby the original total score could be 
improved on by more than 10%. The average 
improvement of optimal total score on origi-
nal total score over the 51 cases was 7.07%. 
 
Table 3: Effect of predetermined weightings on optimum bid strategy outcome 
Weightings Absolute Low 
Fee 
Absolute High 
Technical Score 
In-between Total 
50 / 50 15  15  7  37 
70 / 30 5  6 3  14 
Total 20  21  10  51 
Table 4: Original total score/ optimum total score comparisons using 70/30 predetermined weightings 
Competition No Optimal 
Score 
Original 
Score 
Actual  
Difference 
Percentage 
change 
1 88.00 86.77 1.23 1.41 
2 88.20 80.27 7.93 9.88 
3 88.36 87.09 1.27 1.46 
4 85.83 78.56 7.27 9.25 
5 88.24 81.92 6.32 7.71 
43 95.00  85.07  9.93  11.67  
44 94.00  87.33  6.67  7.64 
45 95.00  93.65  1.35  1.45  
46 93.64  88.67  4.96  5.60  
47 95.45  94.47  0.98  1.04  
48 95.92  95.53  0.39  0.41  
49 95.00  92.01  2.99  3.25  
50 93.99  92.75  1.24  1.34 
51 94.00  88.98  5.03  5.65  
Average 92.19  88.08  4.11  4.84  
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Table 5: Original total score/ optimum total score comparisons using 50/50 predetermined  
                weightings 
Competition No Optimal 
Score 
Original 
Score 
Actual  
Difference 
Percentage 
change 
6 85.63 80.03 5.60 7.00 
7 78.69 73.39 5.30 7.22 
8 80.25 71.49 8.76 12.26 
9 80.00 68.54 11.46 16.72 
10 80.19 76.44 3.75 4.90 
11 84.68 77.56 7.11 9.17 
12 84.87 81.63 3.24 3.97 
13 90.83 86.76 4.07 4.70 
14 91.55 84.74 6.81 8.04 
15 86.84 66.39 20.45 30.80 
16 99.74  90.58 9.16  10.12  
17 87.50 83.50 4.00 4.80 
18 95.65  92.14 3.51  3.81  
19 86.96 83.50 3.46 4.15 
20 86.96 85.26 1.70 1.99 
21 88.64 87.82 0.82 0.94 
22 87.56  86.30  1.27  1.47  
23 86.96 81.66 5.29 6.48 
24 86.96 83.51 3.44 4.12 
25 86.96 85.11 1.85 2.17 
26 89.47 86.04 3.43 3.99 
27 86.96 81.87 5.09 6.21 
28 90.80  89.28 1.52  1.71  
29 86.96 67.30 19.66 29.21 
30 88.46 86.66 1.81 2.08 
31 88.89 82.23 6.66 8.10 
32 92.94  81.97 10.97  13.38  
33 86.96 73.24 13.71 18.72 
34 87.50 85.57 1.93 2.25 
35 91.82 88.92 2.89 3.25 
36 98.41 96.44 1.97 2.05 
37 91.54 87.12 4.42 5.07 
38 88.89 75.27 13.62 18.09 
39 88.89 78.18 10.71 13.70 
40 96.43 94.98 1.45 1.53 
41 96.43 85.97 10.46 12.17  
42 95.00 89.20 5.80 6.50 
Average 88.74  82.61 6.13  7.90  
 
CONCLUSIONS  
Drew et al. (2002b) proposed an optimal two 
envelope fee bid strategy model using hypo-
thetical examples. 51 bidding attempts, 
supplied by a Hong Kong quantity surveying 
consultant, were used in this paper to test 
the model. It was found that consultants 
could improve there total score by an aver-
age of 7.07%. The difference in total score 
improvement varies from just 0.41% to 
30.80%. There are eleven competitions 
where the consultant’s original total score 
could be improved by more than 10%.  
It was found that when fee scores vary more 
than technical scores, fees become the 
dominant variable. In such cases the opti-
mum strategy is to aim for an absolute low 
fee—low scored technical proposal combi-
nation. Where technical scores vary more 
than fees, the optimum strategy is to aim for 
an absolute high technical score—high fee 
combination. Where the variability of fee 
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scores and technical scores are more or 
less equal, the optimum strategy is to aim 
somewhere in between these two extremes. 
The optimum strategy was to aim for an ab-
solute low fee—low scored technical pro-
posal on 21 occasions, absolute high scored 
technical proposal—high fee on 20 occa-
sions and somewhere between these two 
extremes on the remaining ten occasions. A 
key reason for the optimum bidding strategy 
being at the end of the consultant’s total 
score continuum for the vast majority of 
competitions is the differences in fee and 
technical score variability.  
A limitation of this model is that the con-
sultant’s total score continuum is repre-
sented by three points, the minimum 
number required to produce a quadratic 
equation. In addition this model is based on 
the consultant’s best estimates of the cli-
ent’s technical score. Suggestions for fur-
ther research are to improve the model’s 
reliability by (1) including additional combi-
nations of fees and technical scores and 
measure the effect on the optimum total 
score and (2) measure the consultant’s ac-
curacy of the consultant’s estimate of the 
client’s technical score, determine the rea-
sons for the inaccuracy and then attempt to 
improve the accuracy. The analysis could 
also be extended by comparing the compet-
ing consultant’s optimal fee/technical score 
with those of the successful consultants. 
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